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Public Contracts-A New Right for an Unsuccessful Bidder 
A disappointed low bidder on a federal government contract 
brought suit to recover lost profits and expenditures made in 
preparing his bid. The bids had been solicited under The Armed 
Services Procurement Act of 1947 which directs that contracts 
shall be awarded " ... to that responsible bidder whose bid, con-
forming to the invitation for bids, will be most advantageous to 
the Government, price and other factors considered: Provided, 
That all bids may be rejected when the agency head determines 
that it is in the public interest so to do."1 Seven bids were entered 
and the contract awarded to the highest bidder. Plaintiff showed 
that independent tests found plaintiff's product met specifications 
as well as the successful high bidder's product, and also that the 
same situation had occurred before with the same bidders in-
volved. The government agency awarded the contract on the 
grounds that the successful bidder was the only one meeting 
specifications. In the Court of Claims held: Where the government 
does not invite bids in good faith but invites bids with intent 
wilfully, arbitrarily, and capriciously to disregard its obligation 
to accept the bid most advantageous to the government, the ex-
penses of preparing such bid may be recovered on the theory that 
the government impliedly warrants honest consideration of bids 
submitted.2 
The most interesting facet of this case is that it allows a new 
form of recovery to an unsuccessful bidder. Historically, the unsuc-
cessful bidder has had little success in court.3 This is particularly 
1 The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 62 Stat. 21, 41 U.S.C.§ 
152 (b) (1952). 
2 Heyer Products Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (1956). 
3 Exemplary of the holdings on the subject is the following: "The man-
damus, being brought solely in behalf of the petitioners, it was incumbent 
upon them to allege a special pecuniary interest in the matter, showing 
a clear legal right to the relief asked, which they did not and cannot do, 
for the reason that the rejection of their bid did not give them any private 
right which they could enforce by mandamus or otherwise. This is for two 
reasons: (1) Because the advertisement was not an offer of a contract, but 
an offer to receive proposals for a contract, and (2) because the statute 
requiring that contracts be let to the lowest and best bidder was designed 
for the benefit and protection of the public and not the bidders." State 
ex rel. Johnson v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 483, 485, 98 S.W.2d 677, 679 (1936) over-
ruling State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 183 Mo. App. 463, 167 
S.W. 1123 (1914) and State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Bourne, 151 Mo. 
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evident in cases against state and federal instrumentalities, as op-
posed to municipalities.4 The general theory denying recovery to an 
unsuccessful bidder is that no vested legal right in the bidder, which 
would give rise to a cause of action, has been infringed. In applying 
this theory, the courts have voiced a number of reasons for their re-
luctance to find a cause of action. The most prevalent reasons are 
(1) a contract was never consummated, thus failure of performance 
on either side would not evoke an actionable right for breach,0 and 
(2) statutes governing the award of bids are enacted for the benefit 
of the public and not the bidders, thus a failure to follow the man-
dates of the statute conferred no actionable right upon the bidder.fl 
Some other reasons have been the judicial reluctance to interfere 
App. 104, 131 S.W. 896 (1910). Also: Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 
113 (1914); Wooldridge Mfg. Co. v. U.S. 235 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1956); 
Fulton Iron Co. v. Larson, 171 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Colorado Paving 
Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (8th Cir. 1897); Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235, 
11 S.W.2d 278 (1928); State ex rel. Doniphan State Bank v. Harris, 265 
Mo. 190, 176 S.W. 9 (1915); Anderson v. Public Schools, 122 Mo. 61, 27 S.W. 
· 610 (1894); State ex rel. State Journal Co. v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386, 3 S.W. 
846 (1886); State ex rel. Nebraska Bldg. and Inv. Co. v. Board of Commis-
sioners. 105 Neb. 570, 181 N.W. 530 (1921). Contra, Brown v. City of Phoenbc, 
77 Ariz. 368, 272 P.2d 358 (1954); St. Landry Lumber Co. v. Town of Bunkie, 
155 La. 892, 99 So. 687 (1924) ; Fourmy v. Town of Franklin, 126 La. 151, 52 
So. 249 (1910); State v. York County, 13 Neb. 57, 12 N.W. 816 (1882) (stat-
ute conferred ministerial duty only); Sellitto v. Cedar Grove Township, 
132 N.J.L. 29, 38 A.2d 185 (1944); Peterson Contracting Co. v. City of 
Hackensack, 99 N.J.L. 260, 122 Atl. 741 (1923) (statutes construed to be for 
protection of bidders); State ex rel. United District Heating, Inc., v. State 
Office Bldg. Comm'n, 124 Ohio St. 413, 179 N.E. 138 (1931). 
4 The reason for this is that unsuccessful bidders have frequently brought 
their actions in the form of a taxpayer's suit. While a taxpayer normally 
has a cause of action against a municipality, he does not generally have 
one against the federal government under the doctrine of Massachusetts 
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Cf. representative taxpayer suits: O'Brien v. 
Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D.C. Mass. 1934) ; Colorado Paving Co. v. Murphy, 
78 Fed. 28 (8th Cir. 1897); Adolphus v. Baskin, 95 Fla. 603 116 So. 225 
(1928); Seysler v. Mowery, 29 Idaho 412, 160 Pac. 262 (1916); Barber County 
v. Smith, 48 Kan. 331, 29 Pac. 565 (1892); Hutchinson v. Skinner, 21 Misc. 
729, 49 N.Y.S. 360 (1897); City of Tacoma v. Bridges, 25 Wash. 221, 65 Pac. 
186 (1901); Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067 (1891). 
5 O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D.C. Mass. 1934) ; Commissioners ex 
rel. Snyder v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 343 (1876); Heffner v. Commissioners, 28 
Pa. 108 (1857). 
6 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); American Smelting 
and Refining Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 75 (1921); United States v. New 
York and Puerto Rico Steamship Co., 239 U.S. 88 (1915); Colorado Paving 
Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (8th Cir. 1897); O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 
761 (D.C. Mass. 1934). 
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with administrative activities7 and the fear that to entertain such 
suits would unnecessarily clog the courts.8In the present case, the 
court expressly recognizes and approves of the first two reasons. 
However, the court holds that beyond these theories ~n unsuccessful 
bidder, at least in a suit against the federal government, has an-
other basis for establishing his cause of action, i.e., that one who 
bids for a contract of the federal government has a right to have 
his bid honestly considered. This right being present, an implied 
promise of fair consideration respecting bids submitted accom-
panies every invitation for bids. An implied contract arises upon 
the submission of the bid which is breached by failure of the admin-
istrative agency to give fair consideration to the bid. From the 
breach of this implied contract, the unsuccessful bidder's cause 
of action arises and he may recover the expenses of preparing 
his bid. As a result of this unprecedented reasoning, the decision 
in the Heyer case is unique among the unsuccessful bidder cases. 
The conventional actions potentially available to the unsuc-
cessful bidder are mandamus to compel award of the contract, 
mandamus to compel readvertising for bids, injunction to stay 
award of the contract, and a contract action for damages for loss 
of profits. The first three actions are governed by the varying 
statutory provisions relating to the award of public contracts. 
The first problem met in the mandamus actions is whether the 
government officer authorized to award the contract is granted dis-
cretion in making the award. If a strictly ministerial duty involving 
no discretion is present, the unsuccessful low bidder normally 
acquires a cause of action and may recover.9 If some discretion 
is allowed by the statute, the unsuccessful bidder normally 
may not recover.10 The courts have been extremely liberal in 
discovering authority for discretionary action under the statutes, 
holding provisions which require an award to "lowest respon-
7 See Comment, 44 Yale L.J. 149 (1934): 
s Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 (1914). 
o State ex rel. Woodruff-Dunlap Pririting Co. v. Cornell, 52 Neb. 25, 
71 N.W. 961 (1897); State ex rel. Whedon v. York County, 13 Neb. 57, 12 
N.W. 816 (1882). 
10 United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.s: 218 (1913); State 
ex rel. Doniphan State Bank v. Harris, 265 Mo. 190, 176 S.W. 9 (1915); State 
ex rel. State Journal Co. v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386, 3 S.W. 846 (1886); State 
ex rel. Nebraska Bldg. and Inv. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs. 105 Neb. 570, 181 
N.W. 530 (1921); State ex rel. Union Fuel Co. v. City of Lincoln, 68 Neb. 
597, 94 N.W. 719 (1903); State ex rel. Silver v. Kendall, 15 Neb. 262, 18 
N.W. 85 (1883). 
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sible bidder," "lowest and best bidder,"11 or allow the rejection 
of all bids12 to vest a wide discretion in the administrative offi-
cials. Some jurisdictions recognize that there is a limit to the 
exercise of discretion and allow review where the administrative 
action has been found arbitrary or fraudulent.13 Consequently, the 
unsuccessful bidder's remedy under mandamus actions has been 
extremely limited.14 By much the same reasoning, the unsuccessful 
bidder has little success in maintaining an action for injunction 
since he cannot show infringement of a right necessary to con-
stitute a cause of action.15 Finally, since he cannot prove a contract, 
the bidder's remedy for loss of profits is virtually non-existent.10 
To determine if the Court of Claims was wise in broadening 
the restricted remedies available to the unsuccessful bidder, it 
must be considered whether the policy determinations in recog-
nizing a bidder's right to have his bid honestly considered override 
11 See note 10, supra. Cf. Stanley-Taylor Co. v. San Francisco, 135 Cal. 
486, 67 Pac. 783 (1902) (arbitrary action immaterial); State ex rel. Dale 
v. Board of Education, 9 Ohio Dec. N.P. 336, 6 Ohio N.P. 347 (1899) (not 
limited to considering pecuniary responsibility); Commissioners ex rel. 
Snyder v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 343 (1876) (may consider judgment and skill, 
honest mistake does not void discretion); Times Publishing Co. v. City 
of Everett, 9 Wash 518, 37 Pac. 695 (1894) (bidder who brings suit as 
taxpayer cannot have mandamus for arbitrary action although can have 
injunction in taxpayer status). 
12 Stanley-Taylor Co. v. San Francisco, 135 Cal. 486, 67 Pac. 783 (1902); 
State ex rel. Globe Publishing Co. v. Saline County, 19 Neb. 253, 27 N.W. 
122 (1866); State ex. rel. Shay v. McCormack, 167 App. Div. 854, 153 N.Y. 
Supp. 808 (1915). 
13 Lands borough v. Kelly, 1 Cal.2d 739, 37 P.2d 93 (1934) (ta."qlayer 
may bring suit to control arbitrary abuse of discretion); State ex rel. 
Johnson v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 618, 98 S.W.2d 677 (1936) (bidder has no 
cause of action although taxpayer may sue for arbitrary abuse of dis-
cretion); State ex rel. Globe Publishing Co. v. Saline County, 19 Neb. 
253, 27 N.W. 122 (1886); State ex rel. United District Heating, Inc. v. 
State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 124 Ohio St. 413, 179 N.E. 138 (1931) (bidder 
has cause of action and may sue for arbitrary abuse of discretion). 
14 Mandamus requiring readvertising has been allowed. See People 
ex rel. Hilton Bridge Constr. Co. v. Aldric!lge, 13 App. Div. 24, 43 N.Y.S. 
99 (1897). For other mandamus actions see notes 15-17, infra. 
15 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Colorado Paving 
Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (8th ·Cir. 1897); O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 
761 (D.C. Mass. 1934). 
16 Wooldridge Mfg. Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1956); 
Royal Sundries Corp. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); 
Talbot Paving Co. v. City of Detroit, 109 Mich. 657, 67 N.W. 979 (1896); 
East River Gas-Light Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N.Y. 557, 48 Sickels-(1883). 
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the practical objections to such a suit. An implied promise of fair 
consideration is not squarely established by any other case au-
thority. Several cases through dictum have indicated that perhaps 
there should be such a promise.17 In addition, it might be inferred 
from the statements of the Comptroller General18 and the Attorney 
General1° that such a right is administratively recognized. The 
strongest argument, however, is public policy.20 It is uniformly 
recognized that a duty of fair consideration is owed to the general 
public to prevent corruption and to insure economical spending of 
the public monies. By the same token, it is submitted, without re-
gard to whether the established practice of competitive bidding is 
wise or not, fair consideration of bids is a necessity to the main-
tenance of the competitive bidding system. Without such an as-
surance of fair dealing, many bidders could become unwilling to 
expend the large sums required to prepare bids. The answer to 
the objections is more difficult. While the courts quite properly 
11 ". • • The purpose of these statutes and regulations is to give all 
persons equal right to compete for Government contracts; to prevent 
unjust favoritism, or collusion or fraud in the letting of contracts for the 
purchase of supplies; and thus to secure for the Government the bene-
fits which arise from competition. In the furtherance of such purpose, 
invitations and specifications must be such as to permit competitors to 
compete on a common basis." United States v. Brookridge Farm Inc., 
111 F.2d 461, 463 (10th Cir. 1940) (dictum). 
"It is true that there is implicit in the invitation to bid . . . an 
undertaking of good faith on the part of the agency of acquisition, in 
deciding whether or not to enter into a contract of purchase, once the 
bids have been received and considered." Royal Sundries Corp. v. United 
States, 112 F. Supp. 244, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) (dictum). 
" ... There must be a point of time at which discretion is exhausted. 
The procedure for the advertising for bids for supplies ... to the Govern-
ment would else be a mockery-a procedure, we may say, that is not 
permissible but required . . . By it the Government is given the benefit 
of the competition of the market and each bidder is given the chance 
of a bargain. It is a provision, therefore, in the interest of both Govern-
ment and bidder, necessarily giving rights to both and placing obligations 
on both. And it is not out of place to say that the Government should be 
animated by a justice as anxious to consider the rights of the bidder as 
to insist upon its- own." United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., 249 U.S. 
313, 318 (1919) (dictum). 
1s 17 Comp. Gen. 554; 13 Comp. Gen. 274, 277. See Welch, The General 
Accounting Office in Government Procurement, 14 Fed.B.J. 321, 327 
(1954). 
IO 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 555, 558 (1937). 
2osee Comment, 44 Yale L.J. 149 (1934). 
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are loathe to interfere in matters concerning administrative 
agencies, it appears that when the agencies are unable effectively 
to cope with arbitrary and capricious behavior within the scope 
of their activity,21 the courts should step in to help right the wrong 
if it should prove necessary. Another major argument of the courts 
in denying the unsuccessful bidder suits has been the fear of a 
flood of litigation that might result.22 The sheer volume of govern-
ment contracts poses a tremendous problem.23 Additional checks 
upon administrative agencies may help the competitive bidding sys-
tem to serve its purpose more effectively. Another consideration 
in allowing such suits ·appears to be whether such a suit will have 
any more of a deterrent effect upon corrupt government officials 
than a Congressional investigation did24 and whether the costs 
of maintaining such a suit may consume any recovery which is 
allowed. The answers will depend upon the circumstances of each 
individual case. But, despite the fact that the remedy may not be 
adequate in all cases, it appears that it should have a healthy effect 
upon competitive bidding. And this new remedy to correct great 
injustices to bidders should outweigh any disadvantages additional 
litigation arising from this restricted remedy might produce. 
It appears the Heyer case achieved a valid result. However, as 
the court states, the rule of the case should be severely limited. 
It should not be allowed to disturb the general theory that a bidder 
has no automatic right of action whenever his bid is rejected. 
Rather it should only be applied where the presence of irregular 
circumstances is clearly shown. The necessary prerequisites of 
21 An example is where under identical circumstances and between 
the same parties as involved in the Heyer case the bid was given to the 
highest bidder. A Senate committee investigated the situation and con-
demned the occurrence as "a shameful story." A short time later the 
request for bids which gave rise to the Heyer case brought about the 
same condemned situation. The annual report of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Small Business is very revealing on this point. S. Rep. No. 1092, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). 
22 Comment, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 382, 389 (1955); Comment, 44 Yale L.J. 
149 (1934); Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 679, 680 (1951). 
23 15 billion dollars of military contracts yearly. 102 Cong. Rec. A271 
(1956). " ... Federal construction during the fiscal year 1954 will ap-
proximate 6 billion dollars. The Government of the U.S. will continue 
to be the largest, most extensive, and prolific client of the construction 
industry in this country." Gantt, Selected Government Contract Problems, 
14 Fed.B.J. 388 (1954). 
24 See generally, S. Rep. No. 1092, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). 
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such a suit appear to be (1) a public contract2;:; and (2) clear evi-
dence that the administrative agency arbitrarily and capriciously 
decided, prior to the opening of the bids, who would receive the 
contract regardless of what each bid offered. Under such circum-
stances the unsuccessful bidder should be entitled to recover the 
expenses of preparing his bid. 
V. Thompson Snyder, '58 
